ONTOGRAPHY RECAPITULATES PHILOLOGY:
THE MYTHIC NATURE OF ANXIETY

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"In the beginning was the Word . . . ."

John 1:1

The reader will recognize in the title a play of words on the now discredited Von Baer’s law—ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. The intent of the sesquipedalian title is to dramatize through an ennobled slang the central thesis of this paper: a person’s construction of what is real is guided to a great extent by the words available to him. The thesis bears a kinship to the Whorfian hypothesis that posits the shaping of a person’s Weltanschauung through grammar, syntax, and other formal aspects of his language (Whorf, 1956). Not intended to be as general as Whorf’s, the present thesis claims that attempts to fill gaps in knowledge (to answer cosmological questions) are facilitated by the use of metaphor and that under some conditions metaphors are illicitly transformed into literal truths or myths. Since myths require no independent empirical confirmation, cosmological uncertainties can be resolved by invoking a myth. Thus, ontology (the sequences of answers to questions about what is) is dependent upon philological, that is, etymological, developments (words available through metaphor and myth).

This paper extends and elaborates an argument presented a few years ago, that the official doctrine of anxiety may best be regarded as the reification of a metaphor (Sarbin, 1964). My point of departure was the fact that “anxiety” is a member of a class of mental state words in psychology, words that seem to lead lives of their own—their status uninfluenced by empirical events or by rational argument. For this reason, I turned to a historico-linguistic analysis.

In condensed form, I began the argument as follows: The word “anxiety” entered modern English as a variant of Middle English “anguish.” The word came into use when the effects of the great religious revivals in Europe were carried to the common man in the towns and villages. Unlike the older ecclesiastical words that denoted the more ritualized aspects of formal religion, the new words were intended to represent the inward and personal forms of faith. Devotion, duty, pity, comfort, conscience, purity, and salvation were among other words introduced during the thirteenth century coincidentally with the building of the great churches and monastic houses of medieval England (Smith, 1912).

These ecclesiastical words were the forerunners of mental state words of which “anxiety” is a prime example. Intended to denote the activities of a shadowlike entity in a private, misty word, they are unlike terms standing for distal or proximal occurrences. Since words have a natural history, it is possible to reconstruct the development of mental state terms. The rule that seems to apply in most instances may be stated concisely as follows: The construction of words is motivated by metaphor. The natural history of word formation appears to follow a course somewhat as follows: Words were coined in the first instance to denote distal (external) events, the recognition of and communication about these events being functional in the maintenance of a collectivity. When it became

The title developed out of an interplay with Henry Alkcr, who saw the phonic and conceptual similarities between “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” and “ontology recapitulates philology.” The present report is based upon a symposium paper read at the 1967 meeting of the Western Psychological Association under the title “A Metaphorical Analysis of Anxiety.” I am grateful to Daniel Goldstine, Stephen Friedman, Kitaek Chun, Karl E. Scheibe, Jonas Langer, and, particularly, Joseph B. Juhasz, for discussions that helped clarify obscure points. I am grateful also to the chairman of the symposium, Paul McReynolds, and the discussant, Sheldon Korchin, for taking positions that helped me overcome some expository obstacles.

The remainder of Section I is considerably abridged from my earlier paper.

The author recognizes that there are other motivations involved in word formation besides metaphor, for example, onomatopoeia. (See Ullmann, 1962.)
necessary to communicate about proximal (somatic) events, words were borrowed from the distal language system and employed to denote the proximal event. The borrowing was metaphorical: because of some partial similarity, some shared characteristic between the distal and proximal referents, a word from the distal idiom was employed for the proximal event. A current example is the phrase "butterfly in the stomach," based on the similarity between a rhythmic somaesthetic experience and the rhythmic fluttering of a butterfly. Some people use "flutters" and others "butterflies" as shorter descriptive terms for the same somatic event.

On the theory presented here, the word anguish should have denoted events in the distal or proximal ecology before it was borrowed to denote a religious (and later, a mentalistic) experience. As used in medieval times, the predecessor of "anxiety," "anguish," carried the meaning of suffering of the soul. But "anguish" was the anglicized version of the old French word "anguisse," which denoted a painful, choking sensation in the throat. Thus, we find a bodily, proximal referent for a term which was later borrowed to denote a state of mind. Since metaphor is achieved through composing an analogy, we might reconstruct the origins of "anguish" as follows: A choking sensation in the throat produced, let us say, by swallowing a fish bone is denoted by the term anguisse or anguish. The death of close kin, a misfortune, the recognition of sin, and similar events often lead to a similar proximal event—a lump in the throat. Here are two proximal events that share one property, namely, discomfort in the throat. To complete the analogy, their symbols are also shared; the term denoting one is employed to denote the other—ignoring the weighty fact that their antecedents are in different modalities, different idioms.

It remains to be demonstrated, however, that anguish became a term denoting a mental state rather than certain proximal events in the throat, following certain social and metaphysical developments. The context in which mental state is used is best expressed by the polarity inside-outside. For an approach to the understanding of how the mental or psychical world was allocated to the inside, I suggest the following: Two classes of proximal inputs can be identified. The first occurs in a context of distal events. Thus, pain in a skinned knee occurs in the context of falling on a hard, abrasive sidewalk; a burning irritation in the eye occurs after clumsily walking into an open door, etc. The second class of proximal inputs occurs in the absence of recognizable distal events, such as toothaches, headaches, precordial pain, neuritis, gastritis, etc. Since the antecedents of the latter proximal inputs could not be located in the outside world by medieval man, the locus of the bodily perception was taken as the causal locus, that is, inside the body. Having little knowledge about nor interest in anatomy, medieval man knew in a dim way that there were some organs, tubes, fluids, and bones, and he knew there were empty spaces. So, under the authority of the preachers (and later the philosophers) he learned that an invisible, mysterious spirit resided in these otherwise empty spaces. On this kind of belief system, events for which there were no observed distal contexts could be attributed to the workings of this inner spiritual entity. So proximal events, such as lumps in the throat, which could not be causally related to happenings in the distal environment were causally related to occurrences inside the person. Certain of these occurrences later came to be identified as differentiated properties of the soul, or spirit, through the tour de force of employing dispositional terms that had become detached from their distal-proximal moorings.

II

A few remarks about dispositional terms are in order. Dispositional terms increase efficiency and convenience in a language in that they denote sequences of occurrences that cluster together. It is as if dispositional terms were a form of linguistic shorthand. When applied to distal events, this linguistic shorthand denotes a range of events, for example, "springlike" is intended to denote events dealing with weather, vegetation, rainfall, relative periods of light and dark, and so on. Such shorthand terms have also been invented or borrowed to communicate about human actions that occur together: common examples are industrious, kind, gracious, wicked, strong, and loyal. Note that the adjectival form of such words is employed to denote sequences or clusters of actions applicable to human beings. From the shorthand adjectival form, the dispositional or trait forms arose. Dispositional terms convey the notion that given such-and-such conditions, certain properties of a thing or person will be revealed.
The utility of dispositional terms is evident in describing important characteristics of persons, and, in a sense, forecasting human conduct under specificable conditions. To identify a man as “honest” provides a current description and a forecast of what he will do under certain conditions. In addition to this descriptive and forecasting function, where the referents are in the distal/proximal ecologies, dispositional terms make it possible to communicate about events with subsistent referents, that is, imaginary things and vague events that are not so reliably determined as ordinary distal events and commonly experienced proximal events. Among the subsistent referents for which such dispositional terms are borrowed are those created, constructed, or hypothesized to fill gaps in knowledge. The history of psychology is to a great extent the history of attempts to fill gaps in knowledge through the use of dispositional terms which denoted objects or characteristics that had no empirical reference, such as mental states, psyche, and mind, etc.

The etymological history of anxiety follows the sequence just outlined. Although originally coined to denote a somatic event, anguish came to be used as a dispositional term—a shorthand expression for a cluster of events, one of which was constriction of the throat. Unlike its earlier somatic usage, as a dispositional term it probably denoted associated antecedent and concurrent conditions, such as interruption, conflict, choice, or disappointment. Its use implied a catalog of interconnected events, each item of which was, in principle, knowable.

It now remains to show how the use of anguish as a dispositional term with empirical reference became converted to a mental state term. As I suggested before, on the near-absoluteness of the clergy the ontological status of the soul was not doubted. Events for which there were no observed distal contexts could readily be attributed to the operations of the immortal soul.

This state of affairs paved the way for locating dispositions inside the person and calling them actions of the soul and, later, states of mind. If the cause of an event had no external locus, it must have an internal locus. If the causal event is stated in dispositional terms, then the dispositional referent must be located inside. The soul, and in later years the mind, thus became the repository for reified dispositions, and in keeping with the assumed thing-character of the soul, the dispositions were codified as substantives. Codified in this way, dispositions tend to be treated in the same way as other substantives, as having the same order of qualities as palpable objects. If nouns were names of things, and things had location, the problem became that of where to locate the referent for these nouns. The answer was the same as that for locating the cause of pain in the absence of distal contexts—inside. In this way, anguish—as well as joy, anger, hostility, and other dispositions—came to be located inside the previously hypothetically constructed mind. With increasing attention from scholastic writers, the substantives came to be regarded as names for differentiations of a basic mind-stuff.

III

I have just described a four-stage linguistic process in which a construct is formed. The motivation to invent concepts, it may be asserted here, is to resolve uncertainty or ambiguity. Given the strength of belief in theological entities and given questions about causality of human conduct, gaps in knowledge may readily be filled by postulating mental states. Anxiety was one of these mental states. In modern jargon, it was introduced as a hypothetical construct to account for behavioral outcomes that could not be satisfactorily explained with existing knowledge. In general, the hypothetical construct is first labeled so that its hypotheticalness, its metaphoric status, is apparent. For example, some obscure medieval churchman might have said, “It is as if there is a stuff (that controls thinking (or minding))”; a seventeenth century mental philosopher, taking his cue from Aristotle, might have argued, “It is as if the mind is split, like Gaul, into three parts.” Bleuler’s achievement might have begun from an attempt to summarize his observations with, “It is as if the intellect is split from the will.” Freud’s writings show the use of metaphor in, among other things, noting the operations of a fictive censor. Anxiety as a mental state had its origins in the same way.

The history of psychology shows repeatedly that such metaphors or hypothetical constructs tend to become reified. The auxiliary grammatical device, the “as if,” is dropped, and the deformed sentence renders the construction as literal truth. It is frequently the case that filling the gap in knowledge through the use of metaphor is satisfying only for a short time. For reasons still unknown, there is a
common human tendency to drop the metaphoric auxiliary terms. That is to say, when an explanation is given in the tentative mode through metaphor, the listener or reader short-circuits or unlabels the metaphor and reproduces the explanation as literal truth.

This common tendency was reflected in the now classic study reported by Carmichael, Hogan, and Walter (1932). The experimenter presented figures that could be described by two labels. For example, two adjacent circles were described by the experimenter under one condition as “this resembles a pair of glasses” and under another condition as “this resembles a dumbbell.” When the subjects reproduced the figures, they dropped the “as if,” the metaphoric modifier implicitly contained in the word “resembles,” and drew pictures of glasses or dumbbells.

If we apply this model to more global aspects of cognition, we can posit a common tendency to transform metaphors to myths. (The word myth is here used to mean a literal statement, unsupported by empirical evidence, used as a guide to action.) As was stated before, a historical analysis of psychology (and other sciences as well) seems to show repeatedly how a thinker will note that two events have a common property and will construct a verbal analogy. In uttering it to himself or to his first audience, he will label the metaphor. But his audience will tend to drop the metaphoric qualifier, and in so doing, will create conditions for myth making.

To test the generality of this tendency for metaphor-to-myth transformation, I recently performed an exploratory experiment. I read to a class of 200 undergraduates short news releases of three recent developments in pharmacology and psychiatry. Each of the accounts contained metaphoric constructions of the form, “It was as if the volitional faculty was separated from the action faculty.” Under conditions of recall and reproduction, immediate and remote, the frequency of metaphor-to-myth transformations was exceedingly high. There were 15 opportunities for each subject to make a metaphor-to-myth transformation. On the average, each protocol contained about 11 such transformations. (Some of the subjects appeared to be resistant to this general tendency, and I hope to find correlates to help account for the variation.) The point need not be further labored. Human beings—including psychologists—construct their cosmological worlds, their explanatory systems, out of beliefs, some of whose origins are contained in illicit metaphor-to-myth transformations.

IV

Not all potential transformations are carried to their illogical conclusions; not all “as ifs” are deformed to “truths.” In the experiment just mentioned, some conditions produced more transformations than others. The form of the label used to denote the metaphor was related to the proportion of metaphor-to-myth transformations. A common, everyday English phrase, “the talking machine,” provided the least number of transformations; a coined word, “Aerophine,” that contained phonic and orthographic properties related to another metaphor produced an intermediate number, and a “scientific” sounding Latin word, “sinvoluntatia,” returned by far the largest number of transformations.

This finding leads directly to the next point—the dimension of transparency as applied to the word anxiety. For the person who first employs a metaphor, the word embraces common characteristics of both the new and conventional referents. For him, the metaphor is necessarily transparent. That is to say, the connection between the new term and the old is obvious. When that unknown medieval writer borrowed “anguisse,” a term representing a proximal event—a choking sensation in the throat—to refer to a differentiated state of the soul, he did so with the knowledge that he was engaging in a metaphoric transformation. Needless to say, a writer cannot construct a metaphor unless the meaning of the new term is known to him, unless he can “see through” the transformation. Let me illustrate from a simple bilingual translation: a person who is fluent in English and Greek may in his own ratiocinations substitute “schizophrenia” for “divided soul” without intending to modify the reference. To him, the transformation is transparent; that is, the stock of Greek roots and affixes are as semantically useful as the English equivalents. When the transformation is reproduced for another generation, the Greek word schizophrenia may become opaque if the users of the term are not bilingual. That is to say, if the Greek word is employed, the meanings attributed to it must be constructed afresh, through the use of
dictionaries, etymological analysis, phonic analysis, or other cognitive work. Such cognitive effort is not required when the concrete referent is indicated by a word that is transparent, that can be automatically deciphered (Ullmann, 1962).

The dimension of transparency is a useful one in understanding the use and abuse of scientific terms. When the original metaphor maker used “ängst,” the transformation was transparent; that is, the label for a characteristic of choking and constriction was used to refer to a conjectured constricted state of the soul. For later readers and writers whose language skills did not include ready access to Norman French idioms the metaphor became opaque. That is to say, unlike the stock of words that is acquired in childhood, where reference is automatic and relatively stable, opaque words do not have the immediate reference and are subject to unreliability and ambiguity of reference.

A review of the history and employment of the modern word anxiety reveals that it is an opaque word. That is to say, it is not acquired early in life—it is, if anything, a word for grown-ups. It does not, as it were, contain its own reference as does the word “worry.” Thus reference must be supplied by the reader or listener. In the absence of glossaries and dictionaries, the reference must be supplied from the context, phonic properties, syntax, etc. An opaque word, then, is something like an inkblot—reference is read into it, and no two references are necessarily alike.

Parenthetically, I was surprised to learn that textbooks of psychology and psychiatry made no use of “anxiety” until the 1930s. After the translation of Freud’s (1926) *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, the word became exceedingly popular among psychiatrists and psychologists. The first translation appeared under the title *Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety* (1927), the second as *The Problem of Anxiety* (1936). It is important to note that Freud used a common German word “ängst,” a word that German-speaking children learn early in life. The translation to the opaque word anxiety introduced reference probably not intended by Freud.

The lack of transparency of the word may in part account for the multiple and unstable reference. For the behavior scientist, such unstable reference creates a confusing picture, as witnessed by a perusal of textbooks, dictionaries, journal articles, and other sources. The inkblotlike nature of “anxiety” is further revealed by the multiplicity of referents. Some referents are expressed in terms of overt behavior such as tremor, coughing, stuttering, and twitching; some in terms of complex conduct such as avoidance, defense, and denial of stimulus inputs; some in terms of antecedent events such as aversive stimuli and memory of traumatic events; some in terms of heart rate, GSR, and respiratory rate; and some in terms that have only vague subsistent referents such as apprehensions, emotional states, states of mind, affects, and feelings. This collection of referents places great strain on the credibility of statements such as, “Everyone knows in a general way what is meant by anxiety.” Such a state of affairs cannot meet the criterion for a scientific vocabulary recommended by Mandler and Kessen (1959), “that its words, from whatever source, must show a high consistency of usage from user to user and from occasion to occasion [p. 45].”

The methods for inferring the presence of this hydra-headed term are similarly multiple. Some 120 different procedures for inferring the presence of “anxiety” were isolated by Cattell and Scheier in 1961. Probably more than these are currently in use. Although the proliferation of methods in science is in part due to technological advances, the proliferation to the study of a single-named construct is facilitated by the lack of transparency of that construct, a lack that makes it all things to all men.

The mythic character of anxiety is indirectly supported in Levy’s (1961) analysis of entries in *Psychological Abstracts*. He made frequency counts of entries in which “anxiety” appeared in the title. A positively accelerated increase in the number of articles followed the introduction of the Taylor Manifest Anxiety scale (MA; Taylor, 1953). The publication of a children’s form of the MA in 1956 showed a similar spurt. No concomitant increase was noted for publications dealing with the related topics of drive and emotion.

Levy’s (1961) conclusion is stated in terms of the docility of behavior scientists to techniques rather than problems. In the idiom of the present analysis, it would seem that psychologists welcomed the invention of a technique that could measure an entity whose ontological status was so unsatisfactory. The employment of a scientific tool bearing
the name anxiety lead to the illicit conclusion that anxiety had empirical reference after all. Hundreds of experiments have been done under the belief that the MA measured an elusive mental state, a psychic trait, or both.

In recent years, the recognition of the multiple reference for anxiety has led some writers to distinguish between “trait anxiety” and “state anxiety.” The distinction probably resulted from the failure to find expected correlations between self-report measures and physiological measures, both of which supposedly reflected the presence of anxiety. As Levy (1961) has demonstrated, the introduction of the MA, constructed along conventional psychometric lines to measure Hullian drive, increased the interest in finding correlates of self-reports. The form of the scale, together with its face validity, easily led its users to treat scores in a fashion parallel to their treatment of scores for scales constructed by a similar method. Such scales are traditionally assigned names that represent traits or dispositions—organized and durable systems of response ready to be activated under appropriate stimulus conditions. Anxiety as a trait, however, has not fared well. In the first place, the MA correlates with psychiatric ratings of anxiety to the same extent as with measures that have little to do with conventional formulations of psychiatric disorder. Further, the scale appears to be negatively correlated with social desirability (Mukherjee, 1966). The semantic properties of trait anxiety, upon reflection, appear to be no different from other mental state terms. It is as if the mind could be differentiated into various substructures of a dispositional sort—not unlike the Gall-Spurzheim phrenological notion. In this sense, trait anxiety is not different from anxiety as a mental state.

The construction of the concept “state anxiety” undoubtedly followed from the age-old observation that under some conditions (sometimes called “emotional states”) various physiological systems were activated. It is not easy to determine whether “state” in this usage is to be regarded as the same “state” as in state of grace, state of intoxication, state of health, state of repairs, state of being, etc. Because physiological systems normally activated by readily observed distal and proximal events, such as running and swimming and hyperventilation, are activated in the absence of such antecedent conditions, a state of mind was postulated as the causal agent. Under the older view of an organism partitioned into two domains, it was proper to ask questions of the sort that led Cannon (1929), for example, to write of the “bodily reactions” to pain, fear, anger, and related conditions. Without the dualistic mythology, a different set of questions could have been asked—for example, “What are the antecedent ecological conditions that bring about physiological changes?”; “Do physiological changes have effects on the efficiency of problem solving?”; etc.

The inference to be drawn from these observations is that the creation of the expressions “trait anxiety” and “state anxiety” has not been fruitful. The former term was coined because of psychometric similarities between anxiety scales and scales that purportedly measured other dispositions, the latter because of the historical associations between physiological arousal and antecedent conditions called emotional states.

V

Most of my remarks are applicable to many currently used concepts other than anxiety. Historico-linguistic analysis of other concepts would lead to similar conclusions: to wit, we are great mythmakers and myth users. However, being human and being subject to uncertainty in our efforts to understand the world about us, there are times when we must adopt beliefs so that we are not transfixed for lack of truth (Scheibe & Sarbin, 1965). The psychologist, no different from the man in the street, lacking truth and needing it to provide a course of action, makes it up. In so doing, he runs the risk of locking himself into a conceptual prison from which there is no escape save to explode the myth that he had constructed.

The implications of my remarks cannot be tossed off with a cavalier reference to trivial semantics, to hairsplitting, or to “I don’t care what you call it.” The labels we use contain implicit and explicit connotations; these connotations constrain implications for action in research, in practice, and in theory building. However, as long as the metaphor is labeled and recognized for its hypotheticness, its as if quality, the user of the metaphor can be governed by openness, by tentativity, and by modulated commitment. When the metaphor turns myth, the system closes. The user of the concept becomes committed to a point of view and unwittingly as-
signs ontological status to the subsistent referent. Most important, having made up a “truth,” he is now susceptible to the query—by self or others—“What is anxiety?” a query for which only unsatisfying verbal definitions can be offered.

The scientist follows the same cognitive plan as the man in the street whose gaps in knowledge are closed by similar operations. However, when the man in the street engages in mythmaking—the dropping of as if in favor of is—he may be labeled with the pejorative “superstitious” or “delusional” (Sarbin, 1967; Scheibe & Sarbin, 1965).

Because the argument is extended and must of necessity proceed on parallel sets of tracks, let me recapitulate. Although anxiety is an infelicitous word, the thrust of my argument is that we find a new word. No. The conclusion that follows from my argument is that mental states, including anxiety, are ontologically mythical. Substituting, let us say, “apprehension” for “anxiety” would change nothing if the referent were still a mythical mental state. The effect of continuing to rely on mental states as events intervening between antecedent variables and outcome variables is to continue the fruitless scholastic search for verbal answers to such questions as, “What is anxiety?” Popper (1963) has convincingly argued that such questions have no place in science; they lead nowhere but to more words in the hope of discovering the essence contained in the word. He stated:

Every discipline, as long as it used the Aristotelian method of definition, has remained arrested in a state of empty verbiage and barren scholasticism, and the degree to which the various sciences have been able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been able to get rid of this essentialist method . . . (p. 91).

The antidote to the essentialist method is to ask questions of another type: what are the antecedent and concurrent conditions responsible for, let us say, efficiency in problem solving? Or for vocational choice? Or for avoidant behavior? Or for unconventional conduct? Such questions require no mental state terms in their answers. To be sure, metaphors will be useful in giving form to, and in communicating about, such answers. But as long as the metaphors are implicitly or explicitly labeled as such, the risk of transformation to myth is limited. Newton’s advice is worth noting here: scientists should take their hypothetical constructs lightly. He also pointed to the imaginary nature of scientific fictions and the necessity for regarding them only as “queries” (Turner, 1961).

To explode a myth or to undress a metaphor is not to deny occurrences. The distal and proximal occurrences—for which any particular metaphor is a device for communication and for which the transformed metaphor is a unit of explanation—may be labeled and explained in an infinite number of ways. The kinds of explanations used by psychologists tend to be causal (Peters, 1958)—constructs inside the organism or mind that “cause” observed behavior. Such explanations are put together when rule-following explanations fail to take into account all the observations. Anxiety is a prime example of the causal type. In view of its current semantic and ontological status, its employment has negative utility for a science of human conduct. When an investigator employs anxiety as a mental state term, he is constrained to look into the hypothetical mental apparatus for the causes, for example, of overriding moral questions raised by Luther and Kierkegaard and other persons assailed by doubt and suffering. The cognitive conduct of these doubters and sufferers can be more fruitfully regarded as efforts to deal with contradictory belief systems, with moral choice, and with uncertainty. Such an alternate formulation to anxiety has the effect of steering inquiry head-on into the antecedent and concurrent personal and social events and away from hypothetically constructed states of mind.

4 Space limitations preclude an analysis here of the problem of construct validity. The attempt to construct scientific fictions has been repeatedly criticized for its lack of usefulness for at least 300 years. Notwithstanding, the demand for causal explanations and the ornamental elegance provided by such explanations led theorists to imagine and to write about hypothetical constructs and their purported validations. (See Bechdolt, 1959; Sarbin, Taft, & Bailey, 1960; Turner, 1961.)
The foregoing remarks may be condensed into a single proposition, to wit: where (and how) we seek the antecedent conditions of conduct is influenced and guided by the metaphors we use. A mental state term, such as anxiety, when separated from its metaphorical roots, constrains its user to look "inside," to observe the workings of the mythical mind. Terms not associated with mental state doctrine are less likely to suggest such internal causal explorations. Rather, the objects of search and exploration are more likely to be the concurrent distal conditions, the beliefs held, and the values cherished. Admittedly, we need conceptual aids to understand the human condition in settings of doubt, of uncertainty, and of unconvincing answers to the persistent existential question: "What am I?"

The futility and futility of anxiety constructs aids to understanding are nowhere more apparent than in that occurrence when the Man on the cross cried out, "Father, why hast thou forsaken me?"

VI

It is unlikely that psychologists and philosophers will return anxiety to its earlier metaphorical status. For this reason, new metaphors must be introduced to denote the conduct, the occurrences, which were labeled anxiety, when anxiety enjoyed status as a metaphor. The dismissal of an old myth can occur only in the context of a new set of metaphors that have heuristic and pragmatic utility. Elsewhere (Sarbin, 1962, 1964) I have proposed "cognitive strain" as a new metaphor to denote the human condition that arises in connection with solving problems of choice, conflict, interference, interruption, overloading, etc. The components of the phrase are chosen to emphasize "knowing" and "effort"—the seeking of concepts and of supplementary inputs to help instantiate (make sense of) uninstantiable inputs (Sarbin, Taft, & Bailey, 1960). Hopefully, this metaphor, along with others, will help us form new knowledge useful in understanding human conduct. In this way we shall free ourselves from the bondage of mentalism and from reliance on mythical states such as anxiety.

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